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DEATH TV?* IS THERE A PRESS RIGHT OF
ACCESS TO NEWS THAT ALLOWS
TELEVISION OF EXECUTIONS?
Bernard Schwartzt
I. INTRODUCTION
Charles Dickens was walking through London in the early morning
of Nov. 13, 1849, when he came upon a crowd waiting to watch a
public hanging in Horsemonger Lane. People were laughing and
singing songs that mocked the condemned person, a Mrs. Manning.
Later that day Dickens wrote to The Times of London: 'A sight so
inconceivably awful as the wickedness and levity of the immense
crowd.., could be imagined by no man .... When the sun rose
brightly, as it did, it gilded thousands upon thousands of upturned
faces, so inexpressibly odious in their brutal mirth or callousness
that a man had cause to feel ashamed of the shape he wore.'1
With these words Anthony Lewis began a 1991 New York Times
column about an action to compel a warden to allow an execution to
be televised. Such a lawsuit, Lewis wrote, "seeks to establish, under
the United States Constitution, a callousness that not even Dickens
could imagine: the right of Californians to enjoy executions in the
convenience of their own living rooms. Instead of standing in a cold
London street, they could invite friends over for beer, pretzels and
death. ''2
Last year there was a similar case that achieved even greater no-
toriety, because it was brought by Phil Donahue, host of a well-known
television talk show.3 Donahue sued the warden of Central Prison in
* See Naftali Bendavid, Death TV?, LEGAL TIMES, May 30, 1994, at 1.
t Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of ThIsa College of Law.
1. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: 'Their Brutal Mirth,' N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1991, at
A15. The last public execution in this country was a Kentucky hanging before 10,000 people in
1936. WENDY LESSER, PicruPFs AT AN EXECUTION 36 (1993).
2. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home: 'Their Brutal Mirth,' N.Y. TiMES, May 20, 1991, at
A15.
3. Lawson v. Dixon, No. 94-CVS-03949 (Wake County Super. Ct., N. C.).
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North- Carolina to compel him to allow a video recording of the execu-
tion of David Lawson, a convicted murderer, who was scheduled to be
executed the following month.' The complaint alleged that Lawson,
who was also joined as a plaintiff, had decided that he wanted his life
and death story to be used as "an educational medium to aid in the
prevention of [crime] and hopefully as a deterrent to others." s The
complaint also stated that "Lawson wishes to inform the public of the
true significance of the death penalty and thus make a meaningful
contribution to the public debate over the use of the death penalty." 6
To accomplish his goals, Lawson asked that Donahue produce a tele-
vision news story of his life and death. Donahue agreed to produce
such a television news story.7
The complaint claimed that Donahue, as a news reporter and
journalist, had "a clear right under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments of the United States Constitution... to effective access to the
execution which requires that they be allowed the use of 'the tools of
their trade' i.e.: television cameras to make a video recording of the
event."8 The warden "informed the Plaintiffs that he would prohibit
and not allow them to video record Mr. Lawson's execution because
of '. . . interests of the orderly operation and security of this
Institution."' 9
The case was decided in the first instance by the North Carolina
Supreme Court, which granted a motion to bypass the lower court and
review plaintiffs' complaint directly.10 On the merits, the court ruled
that plaintiffs did not have a constitutional right to tape the execu-
tion." According to the court, "the execution is under the supervision
and control of Warden Dixon; and that, as a matter of law, ... Warden
Dixon can [not] be mandamused to permit the requested... videotap-
ing.' ' Plaintiff's action was therefore dismissed. 3
Plaintiffs' attempts to secure federal relief also failed. The U.S.
Supreme Court turned down the request to televise the execution on
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Lawson v. Dixon, 446 S.E.2d 799 (N.C. 1994).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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June 14, 1994.14 The next day, Lawson was put to death in North Car-
olina's gas chamber."
After the North Carolina court's decision against him, Donahue
stated, in a TV interview, that his purpose in bringing the action "is to
shine the disinfectant light of a free and unfettered press on a matter
that has divided the nation, divided families, that is one of the most
powerful decisions that can be made by the state. Why... would you
want to conduct this most grievous, irrevocable action behind closed
doors?" As stated by one of the interviewers, Donahue's argument
was "that this is censorship, in violation of their First Amendment
rights."' 6
Was this a valid constitutional argument? Does the First Amend-
ment guarantee more than the right to publish free from governmen-
tal restraints? In Justice Steven's words in a 1978 case, "It is not
sufficient.., that the channels of communication be free of govern-
mental restraints. Without some protection for the acquisition of in-
formation about the operation of public institutions.., by the public
at large, the process of self-governance contemplated by the Framers
would be stripped of its substance.' 1 7 The right to publish may be
empty if the press does not have access to government information.
Does the Constitution confer upon the press a judicially enforcea-
ble right of access to news? This was the key constitutional issue in-
volved in the Donahue action to compel the warden to allow Lawson's
execution to be televised. Underlying it is the broader question of
whether the First Amendment's Press Clause adds anything to the
freedom of speech guaranteed by the amendment. Before we deal
with these matters, however, a word should be said about the fact that
it was the right of the broadcast media, not the traditional press, that
was involved in the Donahue case.
II. PRESS FREEDOM AND BROADCAST MEDIA
The Framers of the First Amendment were, of course, familiar
only with the printed press-newspapers, books, periodicals, pam-
phlets, and leaflets. There is no doubt that they intended the constitu-
tional guarantee to be fully applicable to the traditional press which
they knew. During the present century, however, the Age of
14. Lawson v. Dixon, 114 S. Ct. 1208 (1994).
15. Killer Executed After Losing Videotape Request, N.Y. Tirms, June 16, 1994, at A23.
16. Crossfire (CNN television broadcast, June 1, 1994).
17. Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 31 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1994]
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Gutenberg has given way to the Age of McLuhan. The linear press
has been supplemented by the electronic media which now constitute
a primary source of news dissemination. Are the broadcast media
protected by the First Amendment? If they are, does that mean that
they are protected to the same extent as the traditional print media?
As a starting point, broadcasting is now plainly included within
the "press" protected by the First Amendment. "We have no doubt,"
said the Supreme Court half a century ago, "that... radio [is] in-
cluded in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment.""8 Application of this general principle is illustrated by Cox
Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn.19 At issue there was a statute making it a
misdemeanor to publish the name or identity of a rape victim. Such a
law would plainly be invalid as applied to the traditional press; the
First Amendment categorically prohibits government from punishing
a newspaper for publishing or not publishing particular news.20 In
Cox, however, the statute had been violated, not by a newspaper, but
by a television station. A television reporter had learned the name of
a rape victim from the indictment and had revealed it in a broadcast.
At the Cox conference, the Justices treated the case exactly as
they would have if a newspaper had been involved. As such, all at the
conference agreed that the statute was invalid. "I think," said Justice
Stewart, "that on its face it's unconstitutional.... Here we have a
truthful report of a public proceeding." Even Justice Rehnquist, who
ultimately dissented on other grounds, stated the same view: "On the
merits," he told the conference, "I agree that you can't constitution-
ally [prohibit] the right of a newspaper truthfully to report a public
proceeding."21
The Court was thus unanimous on the statute's invalidity. As Jus-
tice Blackmun put it, "You can't bridle the press constitutionally this
way." The Justice recognized that there were dangers of abusive exer-
cise of press power, but he concluded, "As a practical matter, we have
to rely on the self-restraint of the press in these cases. '22
The Cox decision followed the conference and ruled that the First
Amendment was violated by a statute prohibiting publication of the
18. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948).
19. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
20. See, eg., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
21. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER COURT IN ACnON
177 (1990) [hereinafter AsCENT].
22. Id.
[Vol. 30:305
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rape victim's name. Freedom of the press, said the Court, "com-
mand[s] nothing less than that the States may not impose sanctions on
the publication of truthful information." 2 Under the First Amend-
ment, government has no power to suppress publication of the news.
Under Cox the same result may not be accomplished by penalizing
publication, which has the same effect as censorship. In Justice Doug-
las' Cox words, "there is no power in government to suppress or pe-
nalize the publication of 'news of the day."'2 4 That principle applies
to both the traditional press and the newer electronic media.
There are, however, differences between the printed press and
the newer media which make for differences in the extent of First
Amendment protections available. The crucial difference stems from
the technological nature of broadcasting. The mass media of radio
and television are such, by their physical characteristics, as to make
impossible the literal application of the Blackstone theory of freedom
of the press.' Every person can distribute handbills or even (if he has
the financial means) publish a newspaper or magazine without any
governmental permission. But the same is not true of the broadcast
media with their inherent physical limitation of frequencies for radio
and TV stations. "The scarcity of broadcast frequencies ... required
the establishment of some regulatory mechanism to divide the electro-
magnetic spectrum and assign specific frequencies to particular
broadcasters. 2 6
In the Red Lion case27 the Court stated that there can be no First
Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right to speak,
write, or publish. In broadcasting, government cannot sit by and allow
all who choose to use the media. In the words of the 1943 National
Broadcasting Co. case, "Unlike other modes of expression, radio in-
herently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and
that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to govern-
mental regulation." 2
Owing to their physical characteristics, radio and television must
both be rationed and regulated by the government. Otherwise, there
would be chaos. These practical considerations have led Congress to
authorize, and the Court to approve, a scheme of selective licensing by
23. Cox, 420 U.S. at 495.
24. Id. at 501.
25. 4 WvILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 151 (1876).
26. Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2456 (1994).
27. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
28. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
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the Federal Communications Commission. The right of free speech
does not, in Justice Frankfurter's phrase, include the right to use the
facilities of radio or television without a license.2 9
In Red Lion, the Court went further and held, in effect, that all
the limitations on government power over the press did not apply to
the broadcast media.30 In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,31
the Court struck down a right-of-reply law on the ground that govern-
ment may not command a newspaper to publish specified matter.31
Red Lion, on the other hand, upheld the so-called fairness doctrine of
the Federal Communications Commission, which required broadcast-
ers to provide reply time to personal attacks or political editorials.33
Acting under its doctrine, the FCC had ordered a radio station, which
had broadcast a vigorous personal attack against an author, to provide
reply time without requiring the author to pay for it. The Court justi-
fied the decision as one for "enforced sharing of a scarce resource. '34
Government may prevent such a resource from being made available
only to the highest bidders to communicate only those views with
which the broadcasters agree. The alternative is "private censorship
operating in a medium not open to all."'35
What Miami Herald held that government may not require of
newspapers Red Lion ruled it might demand of broadcasters. "Be-
cause of the scarcity of radio frequencies," said the Court, "the Gov-
ernment is permitted to put restraints on licenses in favor of others
whose views should be expressed on this unique medium. '36
Thus, the Supreme Court has not given the broadcast media full
First Amendment protection. There is, as it recently stated, "a less
rigorous standard of First Amendment scrutiny [for] broadcast regula-
tion."37 To be sure, the physical nature of the medium may make it
impossible for the First Amendment's core prohibition against licens-
ing of the press to be applied to broadcasters. One may wonder, how-
ever, whether that should mean that broadcasters should be subject to
29. Id. at 227.
30. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 396.
31. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
32. Id. at 258.
33. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 367.
34. Id. at 391.
35. Id. at 392.
36. Id.
37. Turner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2456 (1994).
[Vol. 30:305
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 30 [1994], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol30/iss2/2
TELEVISION OF EXECUTIONS
regulation that would violate the constitutional rights of the tradi-
tional press. If a right-to-reply law or a statutory requirement of ac-
cess to the medium would infringe upon the First Amendment rights
of newspapers, the same should be true so far as broadcasters are con-
cerned.38 The First Amendment ideal may be the Holmes concept of
an open "market place" for ideas.39 But it is not for government to
further that concept by imposing any enforced right of access to the
press. That should be true for all the news media, not for the print
press alone.
The argument, based on scarcity of broadcast frequencies, on
which the Court relied in Red Lion, does not really justify any govern-
mental takeover of editorial judgment that would plainly be unconsti-
tutional if imposed upon the printed media. The law should also take
account of the changing picture with regard to media and media out-
lets. There are now far more broadcast stations than there are daily
newspapers. What Justice Stewart at the Miami Herald conference
called "the monopoly of newspapers," as opposed to the "spectrum of
frequencies" which he asserted "is not limited as claimed,"' may now
make the scarcity argument more applicable to newspapers than
broadcasters. At any rate, the time may have come for our law to
require a greater equation between the newer media and the tradi-
tional press. A bifurcated First Amendment was, after all, the last
thing that Madison and his colleagues had in mind.
The Court has, however, recently confirmed the Red Lion ap-
proach. "Although courts and commentators have criticized the scar-
city rationale since its inception," the Court stated in 1994, "we have
declined to question its continuing validity as support for our broad-
cast jurisprudence..., and see no reason to do so."41
Yet, even if Red Lion is still correct and there is a difference be-
tween the First Amendment position of the printed press and the
broadcast media, should that make for a difference in their right of
access to news? If a reporter is given access to an execution, must the
same necessarily be true of a television broadcaster?
In the interview of Phil Donahue already referred to, one of the
interviewers stated that, years earlier when he had been a reporter, he
38. But see CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
39. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
40. AscENT, supra note 21, at 178.
41. 'Ibrner Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2457 (1994).
1994]
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had been given permission by the warden to witness two executions.
There then occurred the following exchange:
Mr. DONAHUE: Why can't other people have-be similarly
moved to watch this kind of thing?
BUCHANAN: If you want to go in there, [be] my gues[t], without
your camera-
Mr. DONAHUE: What's wrong with the TV camera? Why does
the TV camera make it different? 42
The last Donahue query was based upon the assumption that the
traditional press is in a privileged position, compared with television,
so far as access to executions is concerned. That assumption is, how-
ever, inaccurate under the Supreme Court decisions on the matter.
Under them, we shall see, neither the traditional press nor the broad-
cast media have a general First Amendment right of access to news.
III. WARREN AND ACCESS TO NEWS
In the Earl Warren papers in the Library of Congress, there is a
memorandum by a Warren law clerk which summarizes the remarks
the Chief Justice had made to him about a recently argued case43 that
involved television in the courtroom. Warren told his clerk that tele-
vising criminal trials "turns the clock backwards and converts the
courtroom into a public spectacle."'  The Chief Justice denied that
the freedom of the press guaranty gave the news media any special
right of access to the courtroom. On the contrary, he said, "The press
is entitled to be present at trials not because it is the press, but be-
cause it is a part of the public."45
This meant that the press had only the same right as members of
the public to be present at a trial. Chief Justice Warren summarized
the law on the matter for his clerk:
Like any other segment of the public it has the right within the lim-
its of the courtroom's facilities to be present, to speak publicly of
what transpires, and to communicate courtroom events to the other
members of the public. But there is no specific right of the news
media to be present at trials, there is merely the right of the public
to be present.46
42. See Crossfire, supra note 16.
43. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
44. Memorandum from D.M.F., Law Clerk for Chief Justice Warren, to Chief Justice Earl
Warren 1 (April 12, 1965) (Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress).
45. Id.
46. Id.
[Vol. 30:305
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The Warren statement brings into sharp focus the issue of access
to news. No one doubts that the press is entitled to the full freedom
of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment. Clearly, the press
has the broadest right to publish whatever information it may possess,
free from any governmental restraint or penalty. Yet that is only the
same as the right possessed by all of us to speak and write freely. The
press, all the same, is more than a private individual exercising his
right of free expression. The press is an institution-indeed, the only
private institution given specific constitutional protection. The institu-
tional role of the press is to give effect to the people's right to know-
to inform the public and in particular to serve as a check on govern-
ment by exposing misdeeds and other actions contrary to the public
interest.
The informing function of the press has not, however, meant a
superior constitutional position, so far as access to news is concerned.
Instead, the Supreme Court has followed the view expressed by Chief
Justice Warren to his law clerk: The press has only the same right of
access as the general public. There is no constitutional right of access
for the press as such. Where members of the public have such a right,
the press does also. But where proceedings or files may be closed to
the public, the press has no right of access to them. To repeat War-
ren's words to his clerk, the "right of the news media... is merely the
right of the public."'4 7
IV. AccEss TO PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
The Supreme Court first dealt with the right of access to news in
Estes v. Texas'A-the case on television in the courtroom about which
Chief Justice Warren spoke to his law clerk. The original draft opin-
ions in Estes rejected the notion that the First Amendment gives the
press as such any right of access. The original draft opinion of the
Court by Justice Stewart stated, in a footnote, "A majority of the
Court believe that the demands of television, radio, and press photog-
raphers to set up their equipment in a courtroom and portray or
broadcast all or part of a trial are not supported by any valid First
Amendment claim."4 9
47. Id.
48. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
49. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARIREN COURT 205
(1985) [hereinafter WARREN COURT].
1994]
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The draft dissent of Justice Clark, who ultimately wrote the Estes
opinion, also contained strong language rejecting the claim that the
First Amendment gives the press any right of access to trials.50 The
Sixth Amendment, the draft notes, guarantees the accused a public
trial, however "[t]he Constitution says nothing of any comparable
right to the public or to the news media."-" The draft then refers spe-
cifically to the assertion that the First Amendment gives the press,
including television, a right of access to the courtroom.52 According
to Justice Clark's draft, "This is a misconception of the rights of the
press.... [I]t is clear beyond question that no language in the First
Amendment grants any of the news media such a privilege. '5 3
Had this categoric language not been deleted from the final Estes
opinion of the Court, it might have foreclosed fresh consideration in
later cases. Instead, the final Clark opinion of the Court in Estes said
that the press was "entitled to the same rights as the general public ' 54
-i.e., the view stated by Chief Justice Warren to his clerk.55
The rule stated by Estes and Warren turned out to be the basis for
the decision in Houchins v. KQED,5 6 now the leading case on the
press' right of access to news. 1 Houchins was the sheriff of Alameda
County, just across the bay from San Francisco.58 KQED, which oper-
ates television and radio stations in the San Francisco area, reported
the suicide of a prisoner in the Greystone portion of the county jail
and requested permission to inspect and use their equipment in Grey-
stone.5 9 After permission was refused, KQED filed suit, arguing that
Houchins violated the First Amendment by refusing to allow the me-
dia to secure the means by which the public could be informed of
conditions at Greystone.6 °
50. Id. at 209-10.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 210.
53. Id.
54. Estes, 381 U.S. at 540.
55. See Memorandum from D.M.F., Law Clerk for Chief Justice Earl Warren, to Chief Jus-
tice Earl Warren 1 (April 12, 1965) (Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress).
56. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
57. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843
(1974). Between Estes and Houchins, the Court decided Pell and Saxbe holding that journalists
had no First Amendment right to interview prison inmates. Pell, 417 U.S. at 835; Saxbe, 417 U.S.
at 850.
58. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 3.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 3-4.
[Vol. 30:305
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Houchins then announced regular monthly tours for twenty-five
persons to parts of the jail.61 But Greystone was not included and
cameras, tape recorders, and interviews with inmates were forbid-
den.62 The lower court enjoined Houchins from denying KQED and
other responsible news media access to the jail, including Greystone,
and from preventing their using photographic or sound equipment or
from conducting inmate interviews.63
At the conference on the case, the Justices were closely divided.64
The case for reversal was stated bluntly by Justice White: "I don't see
any right of access for anyone or why, if [they] let the public in, [they]
must let the press in with their cameras. '65 On the other side, Justice
Stevens asked, "Can a policy denying all access be constitutional? I
think not."'66 Stevens emphasized the public interest "as to how pris-
ons are run."
67
Of particular interest, in view of his position as the "swing vote,"
was the ambivalent statement of Justice Stewart: "The First Amend-
ment does not give [the press] access superior to that of the general
public. Moreover, there is no such thing as a constitutional right to
know."'68 Nevertheless, the Justice concluded, "Basically, I think the
injunction here does not exceed [the permitted] bounds. 69 Stewart
also noted, "If the sheriff had not allowed public tours, he did not
have to allow the press in."70
The conference, with Justices Marshall and Blackmun not partici-
pating, divided four (Justices Brennan, Stewart, Powell, and Stevens)
to three (Chief JusticeoBurger and Justices White and Rehnquist) in
favor of affirmance.71 The opinion was assigned to Justice Stevens
who circulated a draft opinion essentially similar to the dissent ulti-
mately issued by him.72 It contained a broad recognition of a constitu-
tional right of access to information on the part of the press-a right
61. Id. at 4.
62. Id. at 5.
63. Id. at 6.
64. AscrNT, supra note 21, at 163.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
1994]
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that "is not for the private benefit of those who might qualify as repre-
sentatives of the 'press' but to insure that the citizens are fully in-
formed regarding matters of public interest and importance. '73
Under the Stevens draft, "information-gathering is entitled to
some measure of constitutional protection,"'74 and had it come down
as the Houchins opinion of the Court, it would have established a First
Amendment right of access to news.75 The Stevens draft was, how-
ever, not able to retain its majority.76 Justice Stewart, whose vote had
helped to make up the bare majority for affirmance, wrote to Stevens,
"Try as I may I cannot bring myself to agree that a county sheriff is
constitutionally required to open up a jail that he runs to the press and
the public.... [I]t would be permissible in this case to issue an injunc-
tion assuring press access equivalent to existing public access, but not
the much broader injunction actually issued by the District Court. '77
This was essentially the view taken in Justice Stewart's Houchins
concurrence.
78
Chief Justice Burger prepared a draft dissent which he explained
in a Memorandum to the Conference: "I have devoted a substantial
amount of time on a dissent in this case with some emphasis on sys-
tems of citizen oversight procedures which exist in many states....
This approach, rather than pushy TV people interested directly in the
sensational, is the way to a solution.... I agree with Potter's view that
media have a right of access but not beyond that of the public
generally. '79
But the Burger draft was not to be a dissent.80 Its holding for
reversal received a majority when Justice Stewart concurred in the
judgment for reversal.8 " The Chief Justice then sent a "Dear Potter"
letter that pointed out that any press right of access could hardly be
limited to the news media:
[T]here are literally dozens of people ... who tour prisons....
Many of them write books, articles, or give lectures or a combina-
tion. I'm sure you will agree they have the same rights as a TV
73. BERNARD SCHWARTz, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE BURGER COURT 363
(1988) [hereinafter BURGER COURT II].
74. Id. (quoting Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 32 (1978)).
75. AscENT, supra note 21, at 163.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 164.
78. Id. (quoting Houchins, 438 U.S. at 16).
79. AscENT, supra note 21, at 164.
80. Id.
81. Id.
[Vol. 30:305
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reporter doing a 'documentary.' Can they have greater First
Amendment rights than these others whose form and certainty of
communications is not so fixed?82
"I do not believe," the Burger letter declared, "First Amendment
rights can be circumscribed by the scope of the audience. If so, the
early pamphleteers who could afford only 100 sheets were 'suspect."' 83
On the contrary, the Chief Justice noted, "a team of TV cameramen
(camera-persons!) will tend to produce far more disruption than the
serious student or judge, lawyer, or penologist who wants to exercise
First Amendment rights with a somewhat different objective.",
A later draft summarized the Burger approach in the case: "As a
legislator I would vote for a reasonably orderly access to prisons, etc.,
by media, because it would be useful. But that is not the issue. The
question is whether special access rights are constitutionally com-
pelled.8 5 He answered in the negative. 6
The Burger opinion was joined by Justices White and Rehn-
quist.87 This made it the plurality opinion of a seven-Justice Court, as
Justice Stewart's concurrence enabled the decision for reversal to
come down as the Court decision.88 Justice Stevens' affirmation of a
First Amendment right of access became the dissenting view.8 9
When he joined the Houchins opinion, Justice White sent a "Dear
Chief" letter in which he explained that he had joined the new major-
ity because of the broad implications of the result reached in the origi-
nal Stevens draft opinion.90 "If the First Amendment," Justice White
wrote, "requires a government to turn over information about its pris-
ons on the demand of the press or to open its files and properties not
only to routine inspections but for filming and public display, it would
be difficult to contain such an unprecedented principle. I would sup-
pose there are many government operations that are as important for
the public to know about as prisons, or more so; yet I cannot believe
that the press has a constitutional right to be at every administrator's
elbow and to read all of his mail." 91
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. (emphasis in original).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. BURGER COURT II, supra note 73, at 373.
91. Id.
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It is not for the courts, the White letter urged, to impose a duty
on "governments to submit themselves to daily or periodic auditing by
the press."'  What the final Houchins decision did, as White saw it,
was to "resist taking over what is essentially a legislative task and by
reinterpreting the First Amendment assigning to ourselves and other
courts the duty of determining whether the state and Federal Govern-
ments are making adequate disclosures to the press."'93
V. AccEss TO COURT PROCEEDINGS
Houchins illustrates the general rule followed by the Supreme
Court - that the press has no constitutional right of access to news.94
Instead, the Court has taken the position stated by Chief Justice War-
ren to his law clerk: the right to publish does not carry with it the
right to gather information.9' As the Court summed it up in another
case, "The Constitution does not... require government to accord the
press special access to information not shared by members of the pub-
lic generally."96 The Court explained that:
It is one thing to say that a journalist is free to seek out sources of
information not available to members of the general public .... It
is quite another thing to suggest that the Constitution imposes upon
government the affirmative duty to make available to journalists
sources of information not available to members of the public gen-
erally. That proposition finds no support in the words of the Consti-
tution or in any decision of this Court.97
The Supreme Court has, however, confirmed a press right of ac-
cess in one important area-court proceedings. 98 But it did so hesi-
tantly. Indeed, its first decision on the matter ruled against the press
claim-although the first draft opinion would have given a broad right
of access.99 But a Justice changed his vote six weeks later and that
opinion became the dissent.1°°
The difficult constitutional cases are not those in which the courts
are asked to protect a given right but those in which conflicting
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843
(1974).
95. Memorandum from D.M.F., Law Clerk for Chief Justice Warren, to Chief Justice Earl
Warren 1 (April 12, 1965) (Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress).
96. Pell, 417 U.S. at 834.
97. Id.
98. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
99. AscErN, supra note 21, at 166.
100. Id. at 167.
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rights-each by itself deserving of judicial protection-are at issue.
The courts must then balance the rights in light of the social and other
values involved and define the precise course and texture of the inter-
face between the competing rights. Just such a conflict between rights
was presented in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale.1" 1 On the one hand,
criminal defendants asserted their right to a fair trial, which could re-
quire exclusion of the public and press from a pretrial hearing at
which evidence and issues not permitted at the trial itself would be
aired.'02 On the other hand, a reporter claimed that the press and the
public had a right of access to judicial proceedings even where the
accused, the prosecutor, and the trial judge all had agreed to
closure. 0 3
Gannett arose out of a murder prosecution in New York. De-
fendants moved to suppress certain evidence.'0 At the pretrial hear-
ing on the motion, defendants requested that the public and the press
be excluded from the hearing, arguing that the unabated buildup of
adverse publicity had jeopardized their ability to receive a fair trial.10 5
The district attorney did not oppose the motion, and it was granted by
the trial judge.05 A newspaper challenged the exclusion order,10 7 but
it was upheld by the highest New York court.0
The claims of the press in Gannett rested on both the Sixth
Amendment guaranty of a public trial and the First Amendment guar-
anty of freedom of the press.'0 9 During the post-argument conference
on the case, Chief Justice Burger indicated that neither amendment
supported a reversal." 0 In his view, the Sixth Amendment public trial
right did not apply "because the motion to suppress [is] not part of the
trial.""' And, as for the "First Amendment argument, there isn't any
for me." 112
Justice Stewart, who ultimately wrote the Gannett opinion, also
spoke in favor of the exclusion order." 3 He agreed with the Chief
101. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
102. Id. at 375
103. See id.
104. Id. at 374-75.
105. Id. at 375.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 394.
109. Id. at 384, 392.
110. AscmErr, supra note 21, at 166.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See id.
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Justice on the First Amendment: "I don't think the First Amendment
claim is valid, since the press has no greater rights than the public."' 14
On the Sixth Amendment issue, Stewart reached the same result as
the Chief Justice, but he refused to follow the Burger approach, say-
ing, "I can't agree it's not part of the trial. 115
Justice Stewart, nevertheless, reached the same result because, he
said, "the right to a public trial is explicitly given to the accused; but
there is a public interest and who but the accused can trigger that?" 116
Stewart answered this query, "I'm inclined to hold that only the prose-
cutor can speak for the public where a motion for closure is made by
the defendant.""' 7
Justices Rehnquist and Stevens also were in favor of exclusion." 8
"The Sixth Amendment," said Justice Rehnquist, "means for me only
protection for the rights of the accused.... [T]he Framers didn't give
the public a right to access." 119 Justice Stevens relied on what he
called "a critical difference between seeing a live hearing and reading
a transcript of it.' 20 If the public has a right of access to the live per-
formance, we'll be holding that the electronic media must be
allowed. ,121
The other five Justices spoke in favor of reversal.2 2 They were
led by Justice Brennan, who wanted to establish a constitutional right
of access for the press and the public.' Justices White and Marshall
took the same approach, saying that the suppression hearing was part
of the trial. 24 "The public," Justice Marshall declared, "has a right
because, if the accused is done dirt, the public interest is hurt. The
public is entitled to know what happens when it happens."I'
Of particular interest were the statements of Justice Blackmun,
who wrote the first Gannett draft, and Justice Powell, who was ulti-
mately the swing vote in the case.' 26 Justice Blackmun said that he
agreed that the Sixth Amendment provided for the "public character
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 166-67.
124. Id. at 167.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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of trial.... I think the public directly and the press indirectly have an
interest in preventing the abuse of public business. I'd take the Sixth
Amendment approach."' 27 Justice Powell, who was to change his
mind on this point, agreed."2 As he put it, "This is Sixth [Amend-
ment] and not First."'12 9 Powell also agreed that this "suppression
hearing is part of a criminal trial."' 30 In his view, "the trial judge
didn't do enough when he heard the accused and the prosecutor
agreed to closure."'' The judge should also have allowed the press to
be heard.'2
In a letter to Justice Blackmun, Justice Powell wrote that, at the
Gannett conference, "I do not think a majority of the Court agreed as
to exactly how the competing interests in this case should be re-
solved."'33 On the other hand, the tally sheet of a Justice present at
the conference indicates that a bare majority (Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell) favored reversal.'3 4
The opinion was assigned to Justice Blackmun, who circulated a
draft of the Court that was a broadside rejection of the decision be-
low. 35 In his final Gannett dissent, Blackmun began by stating that he
could not "join the Court's phrasing of the 'question presented.""'5 36
How he saw that question was indicated by the first sentence of the
Blackmun draft opinion of the Court:
This case presents the issue whether, and to what extent, the First,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution restrict a
State, in a criminal prosecution, from excluding the public and the
press from a pretrial suppression-of-evidence hearing, when the re-
quest to exclude is made by the defendant himself.'1 7
Justice Blackmun's draft was virtually the same as his Gannett
dissent, with the omission of the statement of facts (which was used by
Justice Stewart in the opinion of the Court ultimately issued) and
those changes made to convert the draft from a majority opinion to a
dissent (e.g., changing "we" in the draft opinion of the Court to
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 406 (1979).
137. BURGER COURT II, supra note 73, at 418-419.
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"I").138 The Blackmun draft implied a broad right of public and press
access to all criminal proceedings from the Sixth Amendment's public
trial guaranty: "The public trial guarantee ... insures that not only
judges but all participants in the criminal justice system are subjected
to public scrutiny as they conduct the public's business of prosecuting
crime.'
139
Had the Blackmun draft opinion come down as the final Gannett
opinion, it would have completely resolved the issue of access to crim-
inal proceedings in favor of a wide right on the part of the public and
the press. Such a broad holding would have made the Richmond
Newspapers'4 decision unnecessary. It would also have answered the
question left unanswered by Richmond Newspapers-does the press
have a right of access to pretrial proceedings as well as to criminal
trials?-with a strong affirmative. 14 1
But the Blackmun draft was not able to secure the five votes
needed to make it into a Court opinion. 42 The day after it was circu-
lated, Justice Stewart sent a "Dear Harry" note: "I shall in due course
circulate a dissenting opinion."' 43
The same day, Justice Blackmun received a letter from Justice
Stevens indicating that, "Although I agree with a good deal of what
you say in your opinion," he would not change his conference vote.144
Justice Stevens also stated, "I probably will adhere to my view that the
public interest in open proceedings can be adequately vindicated by
the combined efforts of the two adversaries and the trial judge, cou-
pled with a right of access to a transcript promptly after the risk of
prejudice has passed."' 4 5 Justice Stevens saw dangers to defendants in
the Blackmun holding.146 "I am fearful that your holding will tolerate
prejudice that may not be serious enough to violate the defendant's
constitutional rights but will nevertheless enhance his risk of
conviction. ' ' 1 4 7
The promised Stewart draft dissent was an abbreviated version of
his opinion of the Court in Gannett with changes made in the latter to
138. Id. at 416.
139. Id. at 416, 432.
140. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
141. BURGER COURT II, supra note 73, at 483.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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convert the draft dissent into the Court opinion (this time changing
"I" in the draft to the "we" of the opinion of the Court).148 Justice
Stewart stressed that the Sixth Amendment public trial guaranty is
one created for the benefit of the defendant alone and was personal to
the accused.1 49 Even if the contrary were the case, the tentative deci-
sion was wrong; the public trial guaranty applies only to trials, not
pretrial proceedings.150 Nor does the First Amendment compel a dif-
ferent result, since it gives the press no right superior to that of the
public.151 As Justice Stewart stated in his dissent, "If the public had
no enforceable right to attend the pretrial proceeding in this case, it
necessarily follows that the petitioners had no such right under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.' 52
Justice Stevens also circulated a brief draft dissent, which as-
serted, "I do not believe the Court has the authority to create this
novel remedy for a random selection of bystanders."' 53 The Stevens
draft was, however, withdrawn by its author several weeks later. 54
The general expectation in the Court was that the Blackmun draft
would come down as the Gannett opinion.155 Then, a month and a
half after the drafts were circulated, Justice Powell wrote to Justice
Blackmun: "I was inclined to view this case as presenting primarily a
First Amendment rather than a Sixth Amendment issue .... I had
become persuaded that my views as to the Sixth Amendment coincide
substantially with those expressed by Potter .... I therefore will join
his opinion. ''1 5 Justice Powell also wrote a draft, originally as a dis-
sent, which would be issued as a concurring opinion, in which he ad-
dressed the First Amendment issue.' 57 He wrote to Justice Blackmun
that, "I am sorry to end up being the 'swing vote.' At Conference I
voted to reverse. But upon a more careful examination of the facts, I
have concluded that the trial court substantially did what in my view
the First Amendment requires. "158
The case was now assigned by the Chief Justice to Justice Stewart,
whose revised version of his draft dissent was issued as the Gannett
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 484.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 480.
153. Id. at 482.
154. Id. at 484.
155. AscErN, supra note 21, at 168.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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opinion of the Court.159 The most substantial change was pointed out
in Stewart's covering memorandum: "You will note that I have un-
abashedly plagiarized Harry Blackmun's statement of facts in Part I
and discussion of mootness in Part II. I offer two excuses: (1) the
pressure of time, and (2) more importantly, I could not have said it
better."1 60
When Justice Blackmun learned that he had lost his Gannett ma-
jority, he wrote a "Dear Bill, Byron, and Thurgood" letter: "You were
kind enough to join me when I attempted an opinion for the Court.
Please feel free to unhook, if you wish, in my conversion of that opin-
ion to a concurrence in part and a dissent in part. 1 61 As it turned out,
none of the Blackmun supporters wanted "to unhook," and all joined
the Gannett dissent that he issued.' 62
As finally decided, Gannett held that the press did not have a
Sixth Amendment right of access to the preliminary hearing on the
motion to suppress.1 63 The Gannett decision did not, however, finally
resolve the issue of access to criminal proceedings.164 The next year,
the Justices were again presented with the issue in Richmond Newspa-
pers v. Virginia.65 Once again, the trial court had closed a criminal
proceeding to the public and the press and refused to grant a newspa-
per's motion to vacate the closure order.1 66 This time it was the trial
itself that was closed.' 67 The closure order was upheld by the highest
state court.'6
According to Chief Justice Burger at the post-argument confer-
ence, the fact that the case involved the trial and not a pretrial pro-
ceeding differentiated this case from Gannett. 69 Hence, he began his
presentation, "Gannett didn't decide this case. 170 The Chief Justice
noted that open trials were always the practice in our system.17 ' "The
assumption has been that trials must be public. They were taken for
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. BURGER COURT II, supra note 73, at 485.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 561.
168. Id. at 562.
169. BURGER COURT II, supra note 73, at 485.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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granted from 1787 to 1791"-that is, from the drafting of the Constitu-
tion to the ratification of the Bill of Rights.172 "There's a common
thread for public trials."'173 But that still left the question: "What's
the constitutional handle?"' 74
The Chief Justice's answer was different from that given by the
other Justices. 75 "I'm not persuaded," Burger said, "it's in the First
Amendment either as an access right or an associational right.' '1 76
Then the Chief Justice indicated the constitutional approach he would
favor, "I would rely on the fact it was part of judicial procedure before
adoption of the Bill of Rights. The Ninth Amendment is as good a
handle as any.' '1 77
Had the Burger suggestion of reliance on the Ninth Amendment
been followed, Richmond Newspapers might have become a leading
case in the revival of what used to be termed "the forgotten amend-
ment.' 78 But the Chief Justice's suggestion was not supported by the
others, and the Burger Richmond Newspapers opinion does not dis-
cuss the Ninth Amendment beyond a brief reference in a footnote. 79
Justice Rehnquist, who alone spoke for affirmance, asserted,
"There are tensions between Gannett and this case."'8 0 The others
(with the exception of Justice Powell, who did not participate) all
agreed with the Chief Justice that Gannett did not apply and that the
lower court decision in Richmond Newspapers should be reversed.
181
At the argument, Professor Lawrence Tribe, speaking for the newspa-
per, had relied on the Sixth as well as the First Amendment, despite
the categorical Gannett restriction of the public trial guaranty's
scope.182 Justice White alone said that the court "might get some
mileage out of the Sixth."'8 3 The others who spoke on the matter
agreed with Justice Stewart when he said, "Tribe's Sixth Amendment
argument is not appealing."'"
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.; see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 490 n.6 (1965).
179. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 555 n.15 (1980).
180. BURGER COURT II, supra note 73, at 486.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
1994]
21
Schwartz: Death TV: Is There a Press Right of Access to News That Allows Te
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1994
326 TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30:305
Instead, the majority relied upon the First Amendment to sup-
port the right of access.' 85 Once again, their view was best expressed
by Justice Stewart, who pointed out, "The Sixth was resolved against
public trials in Gannett. The press has no right superior to the public
of access to institutions like prisons which are traditionally closed."'18 6
On the other hand, Justice Stewart recognized, "trials have been open
traditionally subject to time, place, and manner regulations."187 The
Justice concluded that the First Amendment furnished the basis for a
reversal. "I agree there is a First Amendment right, subject to the
overriding interest in a fair trial."' 88
The ultimate conference conclusion was, as stated by Justice Ste-
vens, that "the First Amendment protected some right of access ....
I'd be prepared to hold that, in the absence of any rational basis for
denying access, the benefits of openness argue for it.' 18 9
The Richmond Newspapers draft opinion of the Court was circu-
lated by Chief Justice Burger.19° He realized by then that none of the
others supported his conference reliance on the Ninth Amendment.19'
Therefore, he wrote in his covering memorandum, "I have refrained
from relying on the Ninth Amendment but the discussion of its gene-
sis gives at least 'lateral support' to the central theme."'9 The discus-
sion referred to was, as stated above, relegated to a footnote in the
Burger opinion. 3 Even so, Justice White wrote to the Chief Justice
"that as I see it, your invocation of the Ninth Amendment is unneces-
sary, and in any event, it may be that I shall disassociate myself from
that portion of the opinion."' 94 There were also animadversions
against the Burger reference to the Ninth Amendment in the opinions
issued by Justices Blackmun' 95 and Rehnquist.' 96
The White letter also repeated the Justice's preference for the
Sixth Amendment approach, "Although I thought, and still do, that
the Sixth Amendment is the preferable approach to the issue of public
access to both pretrial and trial proceedings, particularly the latter, it
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 486-487.
193. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
194. BURGER COURT II, supra note 73, at 487.
195. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 603 (1980).
196. Id. at 605.
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does not appear that the Conference is prepared to proceed on this
basis.' 1 97 Because of this, Justice White went on, "I join your opinion
based on the First Amendment and would expect to stay hitched if
three or more Justices in addition to myself join your opinion. If there
is a Court only for the judgment, I may leave you and say my own
piece."'198
As it turned out, the Burger opinion could only attract support
from Justices White and Stevens. 199 Except for Justice Rehnquist,
who dissented,2°° the other Justices issued separate opinions concur-
ring in the judgment.2"' This included Justice White, who wrote a
short concurrence pointing out that the Richmond Newspapers case
would have been unnecessary had Gannett ruled that the Sixth
Amendment gave the public and the press a right of access to criminal
proceedings2°2 -that is, the approach taken in Justice Blackmun's
draft Gannett opinion of the Court.20 3 That approach would also have
answered the question still left open by Richmond Newspapers-
whether the First Amendment right of access recognized by the deci-
sion there is limited to trials or extends to pretrial proceedings, such as
that closed in Gannett.
The opinions in Richmond Newspapers-both the plurality opin-
ion of the Chief Justice and the concurring opinions of Justices Ste-
vens, Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun-followed the Stewart
conference approach.2 4 The Court squarely held that access to court
proceedings is protected by the First Amendment.20 5 This is a more
satisfactory basis for decision than the Sixth Amendment route fol-
lowed in the Blackmun Gannett draft.21 6
Even after Richmond Newspapers, many assumed that the case
held only that the First Amendment guaranteed access to trials, not to
the Gannett type of pretrial proceedings. 20 7 A case decided during the
last Burger term-Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court°S-dealt
specifically with a closed preliminary hearing in a California murder
197. BURGER COURT II, supra note 73, at 487.
198. Id.
199. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581-84.
200. Id. at 604-06.
201. Id. at 584-604.
202. Id. at 581-82.
203. BURGER COURT II, supra note 73, at 418-64.
204. ASCENT, supra note 21, at 169.
205. Id. at 169-70.
206. Id. at 170.
207. Id.
208. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
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case.20 9 A newspaper sued to have the transcript of the proceedings
released.210 The state court held that there was no First Amendment
right of access to preliminary hearings.211
At the Press-Enterprise conference, Justice Brennan delivered the
strongest statement in favor of reversal, saying "that there is a First
Amendment right of public access to judicial proceedings" because
at its core, the First Amendment protects public debate about how
government operates. The ultimate reason for protecting such
speech is to facilitate the process of self-governance .... [T]he right
to speak necessarily includes a corollary right to obtain the informa-
tion necessary to speak; in other words, a 'right to know.' 212
Justice Brennan asserted that a right of access would not mean
the "parade of horribles" urged by the state.213 It would not mean
access to grand jury proceedings or police interrogations, which "must
be private to work effectively. In fact, a First Amendment right of
access is appropriate for only a very few government functions. Other
than judicial proceedings, the only candidates I can think of are legis-
lative debates and perhaps administrative hearings. '21 4
The Brennan conference conclusion was, "it is clear that there is a
right of public access to preliminary hearings. '21 5 That was true, in
the Justice's view, because
The same considerations that led to the results in our earlier cases
apply here with equal force. Historically, preliminary hearings have
been open to the public in the same way and for the same reasons as
trials.... [T]he preliminary hearing serves exactly the same sort of
'public show' purposes as the trial.216
Justice Brennan's crucial point was that
the preliminary hearing is really a part of the 'trial' for purposes of
the right of public access. It is part of the state's official proceedings
for dealing with criminals, part of the public show that-like the
trial-reveals how we treat criminals. Consequently, the impor-
tance of public access in fulfilling the purposes of preliminary hear-
ings and the public's need to be able to attend such hearings are the
same as for the trial.217
209. ASCENT, supra note 21, at 170.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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The Press-Enterprise decision held that the First Amendment
right of access to criminal proceedings applied to the preliminary
hearing in the California criminal case.218 The same is presumably
true of other pretrial proceedings, such as that in Gannett.219 But
Chief Justice Burger's Press-Enterprise opinion was not as forthright
as one would have wished.V 2 The opinion stressed that the right of
access applied to California, where there had been a tradition of pub-
lic accessibility.22' There may be an implication that the same result
might not be reached in a case from another state.2 2 Thus the ques-
tion raised by Richmond Newspapers may not have been unqualifiedly
answered in favor of a First Amendment right of access.223
As a general proposition, however, Richmond Newspapers and
Press-Enterprise do give the press a right of access to the court-
room.2 4 But that right is not one that flows from a press right of
access to news-a right which the Court refused to recognize in the
Houchins case3 - Instead the right exists because American courts
have traditionally been open to the public (including the press) since
colonial times.2 6 Thus, the Richmond Newspapers and Press-Enter-
prise decisions are consistent with the basic principle stated by Chief
Justice Warren and followed in Houchins: "the right of the news me-
dia... is merely the right of the public."'227 In the case of the court-
room, since the public has the right, the press does also. But where a
public institution such as a prison may be closed to the public, the
press has no right of access to it.228 Despite Justice Stevens' Houchins
assertion, the First Amendment does not grant the press "protection
for the acquisition of information about the operation of public
institutions. ''229
218. Id. at 171.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.; see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California for the County of Riv-
erside, 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986).
222. BurGER CoURT II, supra note 73, at 170.
223. Id.
224. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); see Press-Enterprise,
478 U.S. at 10.
225. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978).
226. See Press-Enterprise, 478 U.S. at 10; see also Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 555.
227. Memorandum from D.M.F., Law Clerk for Chief Justice Warren, to Chief Justice Earl
Warren 1 (April 12, 1965) (Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress).
228. See Houchins, 438 U.S. at 16.
229. Id. at 32.
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VI. TELEVISION IN= TH COURTROOM
We have just seen that reporters, as well as members of the pub-
lic, have a general right of access to the courtroom. Is the same true
of the broadcast media? More specifically, if reporters may enter with
pencils, pads, and sketchbooks, may broadcasters enter with their tele-
vision cameras? If they may, what impact does that have upon the
right to a fair trial demanded by due process?
Here again, we can start with Chief Justice Warren, for there is no
doubt about how he felt regarding television in the courtroom.2 30 Af-
ter Fred W. Friendly had been appointed President of CBS News, he
met the Chief Justice at a 1964 cocktail party.231 Warren wished
Friendly well in his new job.' 2 In thanking the Chief Justice, Friendly
said he hoped he would still head CBS News when they had television
cameras on the moon and on the floor of the Supreme Court.233 War-
ren responded with a smile, "Good luck! You will have more luck
with the former than the latter.' '1 34
Later that year, the Chief Justice turned down a CBS request to
televise the Supreme Court arguments.235 Warren wrote that "the
Court has had an inflexible rule to the effect that it will not permit
photographs or broadcasting from the courtroom when it is in ses-
sion.' '2 6 The Chief Justice was sure that the Court "has no intention
of changing that rule.' '237
Chief Justice Warren believed even more strongly that television
had no legitimate place in a courtroom. 238 To allow televising of judi-
cial proceedings, he declared in an unissued draft dissent in Estes v.
Texas, 39 means "allowing the courtroom to become a public spectacle
and source of entertainment."240
Estes itself was the first Supreme Court case involving the televi-
sion-in-the-courtroom issue. At that time, only two states (Texas and
Colorado) allowed television cameras in the courtroom, and both the
230. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF- EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT-A
JUDIcIAL, BIOGRAPHY 543 (1983) [hereinafter SUPER CHIEF].
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
240. Id.
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federal rules and the American Bar Association Canons of Judicial
Ethics excluded them. 4' The Estes trial was notorious and received
national attention. 4 Defendant moved to exclude television and
other cameras.2 43 A two-day hearing on the motion was itself tele-
vised 44 Twelve cameramen jostled for position in the courtroom.245
Their activities, even Justice Stewart's dissent concedes, "led to con-
siderable disruption of the hearings. '246 For the trial itself, a booth
was constructed at the rear of the courtroom to televise the proceed-
ings. 47 The Texas courts rejected defendant's claim that the televised
hearing and trial had deprived him of due process.248
To Chief Justice Warren, the Estes issue was not difficult. The
very idea of televised trials was repulsive to him. If they are permit-
ted, he told his law clerk, "we turn back the clock and make everyone
in the courtroom an actor before untold millions of people. We are
asked again to make the determination of guilt or innocence a public
spectacle and a source of entertainment for the idle and curious. 2 49
The Chief Justice recalled for his law clerk how "The American
people were shocked and horrified when Premier Castro tried certain
defendants in a stadium." 0 The same thing could happen here, War-
ren warned his clerk
[I]f our courts must be opened to the pervasive influence of the tele-
vision camera in order to accommodate the wishes of the news me-
dia, it is but a short step to holding court in a municipal auditorium,
to accommodate them even more. As public interest increases in a
particular trial, perhaps it will be moved from the courtroom to the
municipal auditorium and from the auditorium to the baseball
stadium. 51
The presence of the television camera, the Chief Justice asserted in his
remarks to his clerk, meant that all in the courtroom would act differ-
ently because, "To the extent that television has such an inevitable
impact it deprives the courtroom of the dignity and objectivity that is
241. WARREN CoURT, supra note 49, at 191.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 604 (1965)).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Memorandum from D.M.F., Law Clerk for Chief Justice Warren, to Chief Justice Earl
Warren 1 (April 12, 1965) (Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress).
250. Id.
251. Id.
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so essential for determining the guilt or innocence of persons whose
life and liberty hinge on the outcome of the trial. ' 252 Feeling the way
he did, it is hardly surprising that Chief Justice Warren led the case
against televised trials at the Estes conference.
"I think," he declared to the conference, "this violates due pro-
cess. To stage a trial this way violates the decorum of the courtroom,
and TV is not entitled to special treatment. ' 253 Warren rejected any
First Amendment claim the other way, saying he could "see no viola-
tion of [freedom of] speech or press. They may be in the courtroom,
like the press, only as part of the public. The way this is set up bears
on the question of fair trial."'254 The Chief Justice went far toward
excluding television in all circumstances, noting that, "Here, there was
objection. But, even with the consent of the accused and his lawyers,
I'd be against it."255
Warren was supported by Justices Douglas, Harlan, and
Goldberg.25 6 "The constitutional standard," Douglas pointed out, "is
a fair trial. Trial in a mob scene is not a fair trial." 257 Here, Douglas
referred to the 1936 case of Brown v. Mississippi,"8 where the Court
had reversed convictions because of mob violence.2 9 He said, "that
was a judgment not hinged to any particular specific. '260 Douglas
seconded the Chief Justice in his objection to televised trials.261 "A
trial," he observed, "is not a spectacle, whether [the defendant] ob-
jected or not. This is the modem farce-putting the courtroom into a
modem theatrical production. '26e
Justice Harlan said that the case "comes down to the concept of
what is the right to a public trial. It doesn't mean for me that the
public has the right to a public performance. This goes more deeply
into the judicial process than just the right of the defendant. 2 63 Jus-
tice Goldberg asserted that "the shambles deprived defendant of a fair
252. Id.
253. SUPER CHmF, supra note 230, at 544.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
259. SUPER CHIEF, supra note 230, at 544.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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trial. In the present state of the art, this was an obtrusive intervention
of the outside into this trial."2"
Justices Clark, Stewart, and White opposed a flat ban on televi-
sion in the courtroom.2 65 Clark stressed that the trial judge's finding
that no prejudice had been shown was not clearly erroneous.266 The
Justice had tried to avoid the constitutional issue by moving to dismiss
the case as one in which certiorari had been improvidently granted.267
In a later memorandum, Justice Clark recalled,
not mustering any other votes for this disposition I then voted to
affirm on the narrow basis of the facts, i.e., the pre-trial televising of
September 23-24 indicated no prejudice; the trial on the merits in
October was telecast piecemeal-only picture, for the most part,
without sound; the jury was sequestered and no prejudice was
shown.2 68
Justice Brennan was not as certain in his presentation.2 69
"What," he asked, "is the concept of a fair trial? Is there a court con-
cept independent of the individual?"270 He pointed out that "technol-
ogy may bring this into line within the courtroom."271 He then
referred to the trial "as theatre or spectacle that's been part of our
heritage," as well as to a "legislative inquisition," and asked about
them, in light of this case.272 The Justice stressed that "this was no
sham. The jury was sequestered. There's no suggestion that the wit-
nesses, the judge, or others were affected in a way to hurt."'2 7 3 Bren-
nan conceded that, in such a case, "the totality [of circumstances]
might knock it down," but said that was not the case here. 4
Justice Black, who had spoken after Chief Justice Warren, indi-
cated even greater doubt.275 As a starting point, he said, "I'm against
television in courts. But this is a new thing that's working itself
out. '276 Justice Black conceded that the case presented difficulties for
his normal constitutional approach.27 7 "For me," he affirmed, "the
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 544-45.
268. Id. at 545.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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test is, 'what is in the Constitution on which I can grasp as a handle?'
On lawyers, confrontation, etc., I have no problem. I can't do this on
how bad it is short of the Brown [v. Mississippi] test."278 Justice Black
concluded that "the case for me comes down to only a slight advance
over what we've had before."27 9 He also noted that, "some day the
technology may improve so as not to disturb the actual trial. '280 But,
even with the disturbance involved in Estes' trial, Justice Black ulti-
mately came down on the side of affirmance." 1
The Estes conference vote was for affirmance by a bare majority
consisting of Justices Black, Clark, Stewart, Brennan, and White.2 s2
The senior member of the conference majority, Justice Black, assigned
the case to Justice Stewart.'8 He circulated a draft opinion of the
Court that would have affirmed the decision below holding that the
televising of the Estes trial did not involve any constitutional viola-
tion.284 If the draft had come down as the Estes opinion, it would have
adopted the reasoning of the ultimate Stewart dissent as that of the
Court and substantially changed the legal picture with regard to TV in
the courtroom.285
The Stewart draft rejected the claim that the introduction of cam-
eras into a criminal trial, over defendant's objection, violates the Four-
teenth Amendment. 8 6 "On the record of this case," the draft stated,
"we cannot say that any violation of the Constitution occurred." '287 It
pointed (much as Stewart's final dissent does) to the facts, saying that,
while the situation during the pretrial hearing was plainly disruptive,
there was nothing to indicate that the conduct of anyone in the court-
room during the trial was influenced by the television." s
This meant, according to Justice Stewart, that the Court was
presented with virtually an abstract question. We are asked to pro-
nounce that the United States Constitution prohibits all television
cameras and all still cameras from every courtroom in every State
whenever a criminal trial is in progress.... We are asked to hold
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 545-46.
285. Justice Stewart's draft opinion was substantially the same as the dissent he issued in
Estes. Id. at 545; see Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 615 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
286. WARREN COURT, supra note 49, at 192-93.
287. Id. at 193.
288. Id.
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that the Constitution absolutely bars television and cameras from
every criminal courtroom, even if they have no impact upon the
jury, no effect upon any witness, and no influence upon the conduct
of the judge3 9
This, the Stewart draft concluded, the Court could not do and the
judgment below was affirmed. 90
Justice Stewart's draft made the important point noted abovre291
that was not contained in his Estes dissent. The draft stated that a
majority of the Court believed that the demands of TV and other pho-
tographers to set up their equipment in a courtroom and portray or
broadcast a trial "are not supported by any valid First Amendment
claim.
, 2 9
In his Estes dissent, not only did Justice Stewart delete this rejec-
tion of the First Amendment claim, but he also included an intimation
that the First Amendment did support the right of the press to be in
the courtroom.2 93 The Stewart dissent declares, "The idea of imposing
upon any medium of communications the burden of justifying its pres-
ence is contrary to where I had always thought the presumption must
lie in the area of First Amendment freedoms. '294 This First Amend-
ment presumption was rejected in the Estes opinion of the Court ulti-
mately delivered by Justice Clark. 95 It was, however, the basis for the
already-discussed decision in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia.296
One may wonder what effect the original rejection of the First
Amendment claim in the Stewart Estes draft would have had on the
recent law, culminating in Richmond Newspapers, if the Stewart draft
had been issued as the final Estes opinion of the court.297
If nothing more had occurred in the Court's deliberative process,
the Stewart draft would have become the Estes opinion of the
Court.2 98 That would have drastically changed the law on the sub-
ject.2 99 The Court's imprimatur might well have led to the widespread
televising of trials two decades before that practice was to become
289. IL; see generally Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 601 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
290. WARREN COURT, supra note 49, at 193.
291. See supra text accompanying note 49.
292. WARREN COURT, supra note 49, at 205 n.9.
293. Id. at 193.
294. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 615 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
295. Id. at 539-40.
296. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
297. WARREN CouRT, supra note 49, at 193.
298. Id.
299. Id.
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common.3 0 That was not to happen, however, as the bare majority
for affirmance in Estes did not hold.30
The crucial shift was by Justice Clark. Almost two months after
he had voted for affirmance at the Estes conference, Justice Clark cir-
culated a Memorandum to the Conference telling of his change in posi-
tion.3 2 "After circulation of the opinions and dissents, along with my
interim study," Clark informed the Justices, "I became disturbed at
what could result from our approval of the emasculation by TV of the
trial of a case. My doubts increased as I envisioned use of the unfortu-
nate format followed here in other trials which would not only jeop-
ardize the fairness of them but would broadcast a bad image to the
public of the judicial process. "303
"It appears to me," the Clark memo stated, "that the perils to a
fair trial far outweigh the benefits that might accrue in the televising
of the proceedings." 3" Justice Clark then enumerated the factors that
made him conclude "simply that such an operation, at least in its pres-
ent state, presents too many hazards to a fair trial. '3 5 Justice Clark's
list is the most complete statement by a Supreme Court Justice of the
undesirable elements that would be introduced by televising of trials
and, for that reason, deserves quotation in full:
1. The quality of the testimony would be impaired because of the
confusion of the witness caused by the knowledge of being tele-
vised; accuracy would be jeopardized; memories would fail be-
cause of stage fright; self-consciousness would be uppermost
because of the knowledge that millions were watching every ex-
pression and gesture; and witnesses would evade appearance in
order to avoid the attendant embarrassment and torture.
2. The intermittent selection by the telecaster of the parts of testi-
mony to be telecast would not portray a fair image of the trial; a
distorted picture of the case would result and our present prob-
lem in newspaper reporting would be compounded. The entire
proceedings could not be telecast from a profitable commercial
standpoint; telecasting is expensive, particularly outside of the
studio and video tape together with the clipping of it to show
only the most publicly appealing parts of the trial would result.
3. The accused is placed in a helplessly precarious position. He
unwillingly, despite his constitutional protections, becomes a
Id. at 193-94.
Id. at 194.
SUPER CHIEF, supra note 230, at 549.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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victim of the continual glare of the close range lens of the cam-
era revealing his most intimate and personal sensibilities. Such
a psychological torture is reminiscent of the third degree. In
addition, the accused must risk being mugged, lip read and
otherwise overheard when in consultation over his defense with
his lawyer at the counsel table.
4. The camera is an all powerful weapon. It may leave, intention-
ally or not, a distorted impression of the facts with consequent
prejudgment of the witness that may be most damaging to the
defense.
5. Many states do not sequester the juries in all felony cases and
the additional hazard of jury misconduct in viewing the telecast
would be present.
6. Witnesses placed under the rule would be able to view the tele-
cast and contrary to the rule would be advantaged by the testi-
mony of previous witnesses.
7. In case of a new trial or reversal being granted it would be im-
possible to secure a jury that had not witnessed the previous
trial thus placing the fairness of the second trial in jeopardy.
8. Telecasting will lead inevitably to discrimination because the
media will televise only the horrendous trials. As a result only
the most sordid crimes will be telecast or possibly those that
appeal to the prurient interest. This will but accumulate a
wrongful store of public information as to the courts.
9. The judge and the jury's attention-as well as that of the law-
yers-will be distracted from the serious work of the trial. In
this case the court was interrupted time and time again on ac-
count of the presence of the television and radio media.
10. Commercials would degrade the judicial process, making the
court a 'prop' for some product of the sponsor and forcing the
parties to become its actors and raise attendant connotations of
some connection between the trial participants and the
sponsor.306
Justice Clark then circulated a draft opinion embodying his
changed view.3"7 It was intended as a potential opinion of the Court
and, with important changes, was used as the ultimate Estes opin-
ion.308 The Clark draft contains strong language rejecting the claim
that the First Amendment gives the press any right to attend trials.30 9
The Sixth Amendment, the draft notes, guarantees the accused a pub-
lic trial.310 "The Constitution says nothing of any comparable right to
306. Id. at 549-550.
307. See WARREN COURT, supra note 49, at 206-221.
308. Id. at 222.
309. Id.
310. Id.
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the public or to the news media. '311 The draft then refers specifically
to the assertion that the First Amendment gives the press, including
television, a right of access to the courtroom. 312 According to Justice
Clark, "This is a misconception of the right of the press.... [I]t is
clear beyond question that no language in the First Amendment
grants any of the news media such a privilege. 313
Had this categoric language not been deleted from the final Estes
opinion of the Court (which stated only that the press was "entitled to
the same rights as the general public"),31 1 the subsequent law on the
press and the First Amendment might have been different-particu-
larly if Justice Stewart had left in the rejection of the press's First
Amendment right contained in his original Estes draft opinion of the
Court.31 5
The major difference between the Clark draft and the Clark opin-
ion of the Court in Estes was the draft's specific rejection of the state's
contention "that the televising of portions of a criminal trial does not
constitute per se a denial of due process. '316 Toward the end of the
draft, there is the flat statement "The facts in this case demonstrate
clearly the necessity for the adoption of a per se rule"317 -- a statement
substantially watered down (with the "per se" language eliminated) in
the final opinion.31 8 The draft contains other passages that support
the statement of a per se rule, such as the following: "The introduc-
tion of television into petitioner's trial constituted a violation of due
process regardless of whether there was a showing of isolatable preju-
dice;" 319 "Such untoward circumstances are inherently bad and preju-
dice to the accused must be presumed;" 320 "In light of the inherent
hazards to a fair trial that are presented by television in the courtroom
I would hold that its use violated petitioner's right to due process. '321
311. Id. at 209-10.
312. Id. at 222.
313. Id. at 210.
314. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
315. WARREN COURT, supra note 49, at 222.
316. Id. at 212.
317. Id. at 220.
318. Id. at 222.
319. Id. at 209. This language was omitted from the final Estes opinion. Id. at 222.
320. This language was changed in the final opinion to read, "Such untoward circumstances
as were found in those cases [four cited Supreme Court decisions] are inherently bad and preju-
dice to the accused must be presumed." Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 544 (1965).
321. WARREN COURT, supra note 49, at 221. This language is the draft's concluding sentence
and is absent from the published opinion. Id. at 223.
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One interested in what John Greenleaf Whittier called the "might
have been" has ample cause for speculation in Estes v. Texas.3" If
Justice Stewart's original draft opinion of the Court had been the final
Estes opinion, the law on television in the courtroom would have
evolved differently.32 Instead of the relatively slow development of
televised court proceedings that has occurred, Estes might have
opened the broadcast floodgates.324 By now, the TV camera might be
as common in every courtroom as it is in other areas of American
life.325
On the other hand, had Justice Clark's draft come down as the
Estes opinion of the Court, television in the courtroom might have
been constitutionally doomed.326 The Clark draft announced a per se
rule, under which TV by its very nature became constitutionally in-
compatible with the proper conduct of criminal trials.327 Regardless
of the circumstances of the particular case, and any improvements that
might be made in TV coverage, any televised trial would, under the
Clark draft's rule, automatically violate due process.
After Justice Clark sent around his Estes draft, Justice Stewart
revised his draft opinion of the Court and circulated it as a dissent.328
The Stewart draft dissent was intended as an answer to the Clark draft
opinion.32 9 As such, it began, "If, as I apprehend, the Court today
holds that any television of a state criminal trial constitutes a per se
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, I cannot agree. '330
The Stewart draft led Justice Clark to delete the per se references
from his final Estes opinion, and Justice Stewart in turn removed the
sentence just quoted from his Estes dissent.33' The Estes opinion of
the Court, as it was finally issued, could be characterized in the Stew-
art dissent as a "decision that the circumstances of this trial led to a
denial of the petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment rights. '332
Justice Harlan issued a concurrence which also stressed that the
Estes holding was only "that what was done in this case infringed the
322. WARREN COURT, supra note 49, at 223.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. SUPER CHIEF, supra note 230, at 551-552.
331. WARREN COURT, supra note 49, at 223.
332. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 532, 601 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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fundamental right to a fair trial assured by the Due Process
Clause."333 On the other hand, Harlan stressed
that the day may come when television will have become so com-
monplace an affair in the daily life of the average person as to dissi-
pate all reasonable likelihood that its use in courtrooms may
disparage the judicial process. If and when that day arrives the con-
stitutional judgent called for now would of course be subject to re-
examination. 3 4
Justice Brennan also issued a separate short Estes opinion empha-
sizing that, because of Justice Harlan's concurrence, only four mem-
bers of the majority held that televised trials would be invalid,
regardless of the circumstances.3 35 Brennan also joined the White dis-
sent asserting that the Clark opinion of the Court prevented a flexible
approach to use of cameras in the courtroom. 336 In effect, Justice
Brennan was having it both ways, joining with Justice White to con-
demn the majority's inflexible approach and then denying that a ma-
jority had really voted for it.3 37
It was, nevertheless, the Brennan approach that the Court was to
follow in Chandler v. Florida,338 which upheld a Florida rule permit-
ting television coverage of criminal trials, notwithstanding the objec-
tions of the accused.339 All the Justices agreed at the conference that
the Florida rule did not violate due process, but there was disagree-
ment over whether a holding to that effect could be made without
overruling Estes.34 Chief Justice Burger pointed out that "this is like
Estes in some respects. No prejudice is shown in either case and both
were notorious cases. '' 34 1 The basic question was: "Should the states
be left to experiment? '342 Chief Justice Burger replied: "I think so, in
general. Anything that endangers a fair trial is suspect and must be
justified on some ground."343 The Chief Justice concluded his presen-
tation by stating that he agreed with Justice Harlan. According to
333. Id. at 587.
334. Id. at 595-96 (Harlan, J., concurring).
335. WARREN COURT, supra note 49, at 224.
336. See Estes, 381 U.S. at 615 (White, ., dissenting).
337. WARREN COURT, supra note 49, at 224.
338. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
339. AscENr, supra note 21, at 174.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
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Burger, Harlan's Estes concurrence had denied that the decision there
categorically prohibited any televised trials. 44
As Justice Stewart saw it, Chandler was "indistinguishable from
Estes which I'd overrule and affirm.' '34- Justice White was less cate-
gorical, saying, "I think [we] have to chop up Estes some to affirm, but
I'd do that."' 34  Justice Marshall, however, stated, "I'd leave Estes
alone"; and Justice Blackmun said, "I don't think this is Estes."347
Justice Powell indicated that he-was troubled by televised trials
and that there was "a substantial per se argument that ought to ex-
clude TV from the courtroom. '' 34 At the same time, "Estes can be
read as you want. I'd leave it on the books and follow John Harlan's
notion that TV is part of everyday life, like it or not. 349
In his Estes dissent, Justice Stewart had deleted the statement
that "the Court today holds that any television of a state criminal trial
constitutes a per se violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. '35 ° In
the Chandler conference, however, Stewart asserted "that Estes an-
nounced a per se rule. ' 351 He said that a decision for the Florida rule
would require the overruling of Estes and "I would now flatly overrule
it."'352 The majority agreed with the Chief Justice and Justice Powell,
and their position was stated by Justice Blackmun, who wrote to Bur-
ger, "I share your reading of Estes. 353
The Chandler opinion of the Court was based upon a laborious
effort to distinguish Estes, rather than overrule it.35 4 The Chandler
opinion relies on Justice Harlan's Estes concurrence to show that the
statement of a per se rule in the Clark opinion of the Court received
the support of only a plurality of four Justices. 5 Yet the final Clark
Estes opinion, as we saw, did not announce a per se rule. 6 And Jus-
tice Harlan, in his Estes concurrence, did no more than stress what
should have been obvious once Justice Clark deleted the per se refer-
ences from his draft-namely, that the Estes decision held that the
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.; see supra note 330 and accompanying text.
351. ASCENT, supra note 21, at 174.
352. Id.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 534-52 (1965).
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televised trial deprived defendant of due process under the "facts in
this case." '357 Despite the contrary assumption in the Chandler opin-
ion, Justice Harlan's Estes concurrence was not issued to demonstrate
Harlan's refusal to subscribe to a per se rule, since the Estes opinion
of the Court stated no such rule. Instead, Justice Harlan was only
stressing that, in an area of such rapid technological change, the deci-
sion was based upon "television as we find it in this trial. '358
In these circumstances, whether the Burger or Stewart view on
Estes was correct may be irrelevant. 359 As Justice Blackmun said in a
"Dear Chief" letter, "I am not really sure that the ultimate disposition
of Estes v. Texas by way of overruling it or not overruling it, is very
important. Whether overruled or not, Estes now certainly fades into
the background. 360
In practice, Chandler has served as a virtual green light for televi-
sion in the courtroom. In the decade since Chandler, cameras have
proliferated in courts throughout the nation. Such a result would un-
doubtedly have dismayed Chief Justice Warren and probably most of
the Justices who sat with him.
Chief Justice Burger may have written the Chandler opinion, yet
he was far from personally favoring television in the courtroom. "For
me," he wrote to Justice Stewart, "there may be a risk of due process
and equal protection violations in putting a few out of thousands of
trials on TV or in a 'Yankee Stadium' setting."' 361 Indeed, when a net-
work asked permission to carry live coverage of the arguments in what
promised to be a landmark case, Chief Justice Burger replied with a
one-sentence letter: "It is not possible to arrange for any broadcast of
any Supreme Court proceeding. '362 Handwritten at the bottom was a
postscript: "When you get the Cabinet meetings on the air, call
me! "363
The other Chandler Justices were also troubled at the notion of
TV in every courtroom. Justice Powell wrote in a letter of the "endur-
ing concern... that the presence of the camera may impair the fair-
ness of a trial, but not leave evidence of specific prejudice."3 Powell
357. Id. at 550.
358. Id. at 588.
359. AscENT, supra note 21, at 175.
360. Id.
361. Id. (emphasis in original).
362. Id. at 5.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 175.
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suggested that the Chandler opinion should be "clear as to the protec-
tion that the Constitution affords a defendant who objects to his trial
being televised .... I am inclined to think it desirable that we make
explicit that the defendant who makes a timely motion to exclude the
cameras, and alleges specific harms that he fears will occur, is entitled
as a matter of right to a hearing. 365
There was a general uneasiness at what Justice Blackmun called
"the risk of adverse psychological impact on various trial partici-
pants. '366 In criminal trials, Blackmun wrote in a letter to Chief Jus-
tice Burger, "any type of media coverage is capable of creating an
impression of guilt or innocence. Assuming arguendo that more peo-
ple are likely to watch the news than read about it, the incremental
risk of juror prejudice seems to me a difference in degree rather than
kind.
,367
Chandler indicates that a rule of court that permits television cov-
erage of a trial does not violate due process. But that is far from hold-
ing that broadcasters have a constitutional right to televise court
proceedings-much less a right of access with their cameras to execu-
tions. On the contrary, the governing rule on right of access is still
that followed by the Houchins case-that, as stated by the Court three
decades ago, "[t]he right to ... publish does not carry with it the...
right to gather information. 368
VII. OTHER PRESS PRIVILEGES
The complaint by Phil Donahue to permit him to videotape an
execution was based upon the claim that the First Amendment gives
the press a right of access to news not possessed by the general pub-
lic.369 We have seen how the Supreme Court has dealt with such a
claim in the Houchins and Richmond Newspaper situations.370 The
general rule that the press has no greater right than the public was, as
stated, the foundation of the decisions in those cases.37'
Has the same been true in other cases where the press has urged
that the First Amendment gives it privileges which are not available to
other persons?
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 175-176.
368. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
369. Naftali Bendavid, Death TV?, LEGAL. TimEs, May 30, 1994, at 1.
370. See supra text accompanying notes 56-93, 165-206.
371. See supra text accompanying notes 73, 186.
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A corollary of the right to publish, it is claimed, is the right to
gather news. Informants are necessary to the news gathering process.
Many of them would be unwilling to provide information if their con-
fidentiality could not be assured. 72 Nondisclosure, it is claimed, is
necessary for most investigative news gathering.373 Hence, Justice
Stewart argued in his dissent in the Branzburg case (discussed in the
next paragraph), that "[t]he right to gather news implies, in turn, a
right to a confidential relationship between a reporter and his
source." 374 Forcing reporters to reveal their sources would violate the
so-called "reporter's privilege" which, the press has claimed, is im-
plicit in the First Amendment.375
The reporter's privilege was, however, put to the constitutional
test and found wanting in Branzburg v. Hayes.3 76 It arose out of three
cases in which reporters had refused to reveal their sources for stories
involving alleged criminal activities.3 7 In the lead case, Branzburg, a
Louisville Courier-Journal reporter, had written articles describing his
interviews with drug dealers in Kentucky. 78 He refused to testify
about those he had interviewed before grand juries investigating drug
use and sales.379 He made the argument already summarized: To
gather news, he had to protect his sources; otherwise, the sources
would not furnish information, to the detriment of the free flow of
information protected by the First Amendment. 8
At the Branzburg conference, Chief Justice Burger declared, "I
reject categorically the suggestion that this is a specific constitutional
right. '3 81 He didn't "think anyone except the President of the U.S."
was immune from a grand jury subpoena. 8 2 The Chief Justice de-
clared that "[t]hey must appear. '3 3
Justice White, who wrote the opinion, agreed. "Presently, I don't
think I'd establish any privilege at all.... I would not in any event
allow a privilege to the extent of keeping confidential what [he] has
372. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679-81 (1972).
373. Id.
374. Id. at 728.
375. Id. at 673.
376. Id. at 667.
377. Id. at 667-79.
378. Id. at 667-69.
379. Id. at 668.
380. Id. at 669 n.5.
381. ASCENT, supra note 21, at 165.
382. Id.
383. Id.
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seen as [an] actual crime."" Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehn-
quist agreed with the Burger-White view. "It would be unwise," said
Justice Powell, "to give the press any constitutional privilege and
we're writing on a clean slate, so we don't have to give constitutional
status to newsmen. I'd leave it to the legislatures to create one. '385
The other four favored the claimed privilege, though Justice Mar-
shall did state, "I think the press exaggerates the importance of [confi-
dentiality]. 3 86 The dissenters asserted the view that, as Justice
Stewart expressed it, "The First Amendment requires some kind of
qualified privilege for confidences to reporters. 387 Justice Douglas
based his vote for the reporters on a different theory.388 "The Ninth
Amendment," he said, "stated the proper constitutional rule. It's in
the realm of items of association, belief, etc.-3 89
The Branzburg decision, reflecting the conference division, ruled
against the reporter's privilege by a bare majority.3 9 ° The White opin-
ion of the Court stated the issue narrowly: "The sole issue before us is
the obligation of reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas as
other citizens do and to answer questions relevant to an investigation
into the commission of crime."'391 The Court held that reporters have
the same obligation as other citizens to respond to grand jury subpoe-
nas.3 92 The public interest in the investigation of crimes outweighs
whatever interest there may be in protecting sources.3 9 3
Nor was the Court convinced that the failure to recognize the
privilege would unduly chill the First Amendment right to gather
news. According to Justice White's opinion, "this is not the lesson
history teaches us. From the beginning of our country the press has
operated without constitutional protection for press informants, and
the press has flourished. 39 4 The lack of privilege has thus not been a
serious obstacle to the gathering of news based upon confidential
sources.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709 (1972).
391. Id. at 682.
392. Id. at 708-09.
393. Id. at 700-01.
394. Id. at 698.
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In addition, there is the point made by Chief Justice Burger in his
already quoted letter to Justice Stewart in the Houchins case:395 If a
reporter's privilege is recognized, who would be entitled to claim it?
"Sooner or later," states the Branzburg opinion, "it would be neces-
sary to define those categories of newsmen who qualified for the privi-
lege, a questionable procedure in light of the traditional doctrine that
liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses
carbon paper or a mimeograph just as much as of the large metropoli-
tan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition methods."396
After all, as Justice Rehnquist asked during the conference on another
case, "Why, should only Time and the New York Times have First
Amendment protection?" 3"
The Branzburg approach was applied in Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily398 to a search warrant based upon probable cause to search a
newspaper office for evidence of crimes committed by other persons.
It was argued that whatever might be true of third-party searches gen-
erally, where the third party was a newspaper, there were additional
factors derived from the First Amendment that justified a nearly per
se rule forbidding the seaich warrant.399 The Court rejected the argu-
ment.40" Warrants may be subjected to restraints under the Fourth
Amendment, but there are no additional limitations where the press is
concerned.40 1 Like other persons, the press is subject to properly is-
sued warrants.40 2 With a warrant, indeed, any business may be
searched, even, as in Zurcher, for evidence of third-party
criminality.40 3
Thus, in refusing to accept the newspaper's claim, the Court
treated the case as a virtual Branzburg reprise. The Fourth Amend-
ment's warrant requirements must, of course, be complied with in
every search case. Yet, the Court held that "[a]s we see it, no more
than this is required where the warrant requested is for the seizure of
criminal evidence reasonably believed to be on the premises occupied
by a newspaper.'4 4
395. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
396. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 704.
397. AscENT, supra note 21, at 140.
398. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
399. Id. at 563.
400. Id. at 563-67.
401. See id. at 564-65.
402. See id. at 565.
403. See id. at 560-61.
404. Id. at 565.
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Whether or not we agree with the result in the cases discussed in
this article, we must conclude that they do make for a consistent
corpus on the subject, governed by the principle stated by Chief Jus-
tice Warren when he was discussing the Estes case with his law clerk-
that whatever right the press has of access to news it possesses "not
because it is the press, but because it is part of the public."''4 5 Under a
case like Houchins, the press does not possess a constitutional right of
access to information not available to the public generally; under
Branzburg and Zurcher it does not have any immunity from grand
jury subpoenas or search warrants not possessed by other citizens.
VIII. OTHER DEATH TV CAsEs
Phil Donahue is not the only broadcaster who has tried to get the
courts to order televised executions to be allowed. In 1991, KQED,
the broadcast station in the Houchins case, brought an action to re-
quire the warden of San Quentin prison to allow the televising of a
convicted murderer's scheduled execution.40 6 The federal court up-
held the prohibition of cameras.40 7 In his oral opinion, District Judge
Schnacke stated that "the press has a right of access to whatever the
public has a right to, but [it has] no special [right of] access. 40 8 Our
courts, the judge continued, "are constitutionally mandated to con-
duct public trials [and] the press and the public are entitled to equal
access. But neither the public nor the press have been found to have
the right to bring cameras, still or television, into a courtroom. 40 9
Judge Schnacke emphasized that no prison had ever allowed pho-
tographs or filming of an execution.410 But there has been one other
case in which a television reporter sought access to the execution
chamber. In 1977, Tony Garrett, a TV reporter for Station KERA in
Dallas, filed a federal action against the Texas Department of Correc-
tions, asserting a First Amendment right to record on film, for later
showing on televisions news, the execution of the first person to be
405. Memorandum from D.M.F., Law Clerk for Chief Justice Warren, to Chief Justice Earl
Warren 2 (April 12, 1965) (Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress).
406. KQED v. Vasquez, No. C-90-1383RHS (N.D. Cal. June 7, 1991); see Anthony Lewis,
Abroad at Home: 'Their Brutal Mirth,' N.Y. TimEs, May 20, 1991, at A15.
407. Katherine Bishop, Judge Upholds Ban on Videotaping of Executions at San Quentin,
N.Y. TimEs, June 8, 1991, at A9.
408. WENDY LESSER, PICrURES AT AN ExEcurrON 247 (1993) (emphasis in original).
409. Id.
410. Katherine Bishop, Judge Upholds Ban on Videotaping of Executions at San Quentin,
N.Y. TimEs, June 8, 1991, at A9.
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executed in the electric chair in Texas since 1964.411 The district court
ruled that "the absolute ban on" TV access "to the execution chamber
... infringes on the First Amendment freedom of press."412
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.413 Though
its decision was made a year before Houchins, it relied upon the same
principle Houchins was to rely upon-"the general principle... that
the press has no greater right of access to information than does the
public at large; and that the first amendment does not require govern-
ment to make available to the press information not available to the
public. 41 4 Nor did it make a difference "that the death penalty is a
matter of wide public interest. '415 As the fifth circuit put it, "we disa-
gree that the protections of the first amendment depend upon the no-
toriety of an issue." '416 Thus, the existence of a constitutional right of
access "is not predicated upon the importance or degree of interest in
the matter reported. '417
IX. "OR OF THE PRESS"
What has been said thus far clearly supports the decision to deny
Phil Donahue the right to televise an execution. The relevant cases
confirm the point made by Chief Justice Warren to his law clerk in
their discussion of the Estes case: the press has only the same right of
access to news and only such privileges with regard to news as the
general public possesses. 418 To repeat again Warren's statement to his
clerk, the "right of the news media. . . is merely the right of the
public."419
There are, however, indications that the Framers intended the
press to have more rights than the public so far as the gathering of
news was concerned. When James Madison and his colleagues pro-
hibited Congress from making any law "abridging the freedom of
speech," they specifically added, "or of the press."420 Why were those
words added if all that was intended was to guarantee publishers the
411. Garrett v. Estelle, 424 F. Supp. 468, 472 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
412. Id.
413. Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1977).
414. I- at 1278.
415. Id. at 1279.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Memorandum from D.M.F., Law Clerk for Chief Justice Warren, to Chief Justice Earl
Warren 2 (April 12, 1965) (Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress).
419. Id.
420. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
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freedom of expression which they were already entitled to under the
Free Speech Clause? As Justice Stewart put it in a noted 1974 ad-
dress, "If the Free Press guarantee meant no more than freedom of
expression, it would be a constitutional redundancy."4 "1 If the words
"or of the press" are not redundant, what, if anything, do they add to
the freedom of expression previously secured by the Free Speech
Clause?
There is no doubt that the First Amendment was intended to
guarantee full freedom of expression to the press. Yet that right was
already guaranteed to all Americans by the Free Speech Clause.
There are suggestive indications that, in adding "or of the press" to
the First Amendment, Madison and his colleagues meant the words to
be more than a repetitive appendage to the free speech guaranty. The
language they used indicated an intention to provide a guaranty that is
unique among those contained in the Bill of Rights. This difference
was pointed out in Justice Stewart's 1974 speech: "Most of the other
provisions in the Bill of Rights protect specific liberties or specific
rights of individuals: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, the right
to counsel, the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, to
name a few. In contrast, the Free Press Clause extends protection to
an institution. 422
More specifically, said Justice Stewart, "The primary purpose of
the constitutional guarantee of a free press was.., to create a fourth
institution outside the Government as an additional check on the
three official branches."4'
Thomas Carlyle tells us, in his book Heroes and Hero Worship,
"[Edmund] Burke said there were Three Estates in Parliament; but, in
the Reporters' Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more impor-
tant far than they all."'424 Carlyle went on, "It is not a figure of speech
or a witty saying; it is a literal fact-very- momentous to us in these
times."4" "Indeed," Carlyle noted, "in modem Society... the Press
is to such a degree superseding the Pulpit, the Senate, the Senatus
Academicus and much else. 426
421. Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS LJ. 631, 633 (1975).
422. Id.
423. Id. at 634.
424. THOMAS CARLYLE, ON HEROES, HERO-WORSHIP AND THE HEROIC IN HISTORY 164
(1903 ed.) (emphasis in original).
425. Id.
426. Id.
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The Fourth Estate aphorism does not appear in Burke's pub-
lished speeches and other writings.427 Yet it is unlikely that Carlyle
made up this attribution. If Burke did make the statement, it is most
likely that it was known on this side of the Atlantic, since Burke's
words were as widely known here as they were in England. What is
clear, at any rate, is that, influenced by Burke or not, Americans did
develop a concept of the press as a Fourth Estate institution by the
time the Bill of Rights was ratified.
Under the Burke notion, Justice Stewart tells us, "a free press was
not just a neutral vehicle for the balanced discussion of diverse ideas.
Instead, the free press meant organized, expert scrutiny of govern-
ment."42s This was precisely the concept of the press that was stated
in the First American document asserting a right to freedom of the
press-the Address to the Inhabitants of Quebec of 1774, in which the
Continental Congress presented its case to our northern neighbor.429
It contained an exposition of the fundamental rights of the colonists as
they were understood by the representative assembly chosen from all
the Colonies. For the first time in an American official document,
freedom of the press was recognized as an essential right. The right
was stated to be important not only because of its "advancement of
truth, science, morality, and arts in general," but also because by the
press's actions "oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into
more honorable and just modes of conducting affairs." 430
There are further indications as well that, whether or not they
were influenced by any Burke statement, the Americans of the day
had a concept of the press similar to that attributed to Burke by Car-
lyle. Leonard Levy, in his book Emergence of a Free Press431 (the
leading history of freedom of the press in early America), concludes
that, by the time of the First Amendment, American newspapers had
achieved a "watchdog function as the Fourth Estate. ' 432 Indeed, Levy
tells us, "Freedom of the press.., meant that the press had achieved a
special status as an unofficial fourth branch of government, 'the
Fourth Estate'; whose function was to check the three official
427. David Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 77, 90 n.79 (1975).
428. Stewart, supra note 421, at 634.
429. Address to the Inhabitants of Quebec of 1774, reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HIsTORY 221 (1971).
430. Id. at 223.
431. LEONARD LEVY, THE EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 291 (1985).
432. Id.
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branches by exposing misdeeds and policies contrary to the public
interest. 433
To support this conclusion Levy cites a 1790 statement by a Vir-
ginia paper that the press was the source from which the people
learn the circumstances of our country, its various interests, and re-
lations. Here too public men and measures are scrutinized. Should
any man or body of men dare to form a system against our interests,
by this means it will be uffolded to the great body of the people,
and the alarm instantly spread through every part of the continent.
In this way only, can we know how far our public servants perform
the duties of their respective stations.434
A year earlier, John Adams, in a letter to Chief Justice William
Cushing, had referred to "[o]ur chief magistrates and Senators &c"
and asked, "How are their characters and conduct to be known to
their constituents but by the press?"435 It was freedom of the press,
said Philip Freneau, a leading Jeffersonian editor, that allowed news-
papers to "estimate justly the wisdom of leading measures of
administration."436
To the Framers of the First Amendment, it can be argued, free-
dom of the press meant an institutional role for publishers and editors
to criticize government and public officials to ensure that they would
act properly in the exercise of their powers. From this point of view,
the First Amendment was intended to confirm what the Supreme
Court has called "the basic assumption of our political system that the
press will often serve as an important restraint on government. '437
What is clear is that, starting with the 1776 Virginia Declaration
of Rights,43 8 the first American Bill of Rights, American organic in-
struments provided separate protection for freedom of the press, in
addition to constitutional guarantees protecting freedom of speech.
When Madison drafted the amendments that became the Federal Bill
of Rights, he followed the same approach, providing separate guaran-
tees for both freedom of speech and of the press, in what became the
First Amendment.439
433. Id. at xii.
434. Id. at 291.
435. Id. at 200.
436. Id. at 291.
437. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585
(1983).
438. VIRmGNIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, 1776, Art. 12, reprinted in 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ,
THE BILL OF RIGH A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 234 (1971).
439. 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 438, at 1026.
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Indeed, in his proposed amendments, Madison went even further
in providing specific protection for the press. The Madison proposals
included a provision that "No State shall violate.., the freedom of
the press."" Though Madison said that he "conceived this to be the
most valuable amendment in the whole list,"'441 it was eliminated by
the Senate and never became a part of the Federal Bill of Rights.
Both his draft of the First Amendment and his rejected amend-
ment prohibiting the states from infringing upon freedom of the press
indicate that Madison sought to provide specific protection for the
press in addition to that secured under the freedom of speech guar-
anty. In so doing, he was following the constitutional practice that
had prevailed in the drafting of the state Bills of Rights, from the 1776
Virginia Declaration of Rights, to that of New Hampshire in 1783.442
The record is, of course, too obscure to enable us to speak with
assurance, but it can be argued that the First Amendment was in-
tended to give effect to the institutional Fourth Estate conception of
the press. If that is true, freedom of the press is not limited to the
freedom of expression otherwise guaranteed by the First Amendment.
The press becomes a protected institution and the First Amendment
becomes the instrument that enables the press to perform its institu-
tional role.
If this was the intent behind the First Amendment, it has in large
part been frustrated by the decisions discussed in this article. Except
in one area-that of defamation' 3-the Court has refused to treat the
press differently from the public generally. The governing principle in
the cases is that the press has only the rights possessed by the public.
Under the prevailing jurisprudence, the press as an institution has no
greater rights to enable it to fulfill a Fourth Estate function. Instead,
in the words of Chief Justice Warren, the press possess First Amend-
ment rights "not because it is the press, but because it is part of the
public." 4
The Fourth Estate concept might have served as the basis for a
broad press right of access to news. That would give the news media a
right of access to public institutions and documents so that they can
440. Id. at 1027.
441. Id. at 1113.
442. 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 429, at 378.
443. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
444. Memorandum from D.F.M., Law Clerk for Chief Justice Warren, to Chief Justice Earl
Warren 2 (April 12, 1965) (Earl Warren Papers, Library of Congress).
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perform their function of informing the public and thus holding gov-
ernment to proper standards. As a federal court stated in a 1965 case
enjoining enforcement of a state senate resolution barring a paper's
reporters from its proceedings, "To sanction such a use of state power
would be to take a dangerous step toward press control and
censorship." 4 5
In his dissent in the Houchins case, Justice Stevens urged that the
need for a press right of access "rested upon the special importance of
allowing a democratic community access to knowledge about how its
servants were [acting]."" 6 As we saw, the Stevens opinion was origi-
nally prepared as the draft Houchins opinion of the Court, but a vote
switch changed the decision and the opinion became the Stevens dis-
sent. If the opinion had come down as the opinion of the Court, our
law would have been on the way to confirming a press right of access
to news. The final Houchins decision, however, meant that the new
right was stillborn. Instead of the affirmation of the right of access to
news that it would have been under the Stevens opinion, Houchins
stands as the leading case denying that the right of access of the press
is any greater than that of the public." 7
There is no doubt that the Supreme Court jurisprudence on the
matter has rejected the Fourth Estate concept of the press with addi-
tional institutional rights and has instead accepted the Warren notion
of the press vested only with the same rights as members of the public.
In practice, this means that the press is, in the main given only the
right guaranteed to everyone by the Free Speech Clause - full free-
dom of expression. From this point of view, the First Amendment did
not give the press more rights than it would have if the Press Clause
had never been added by Madison and his colleagues.
This result may make the words "or of the press" in the First
Amendment superfluous. If the Framers intended the Press Clause to
vest additional institutional rights in the press to enable it to perform
a Fourth Estate function, that intention has been frustrated by the
case law. The public's right to know about its government is protected
by the existence of a free press, but the protection is indirect, 4 8 since
it is based upon the broad right of expression under the Free Speech
Clause, not on any greater rights to secure and report information
vested in the press.
445. Kovach v. Maddux, 238 F. Supp. 835, 844 (M.D. Tenn. 1965).
446. Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 38 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
447. Id at 1.
448. Compare with Stewart, supra note 421, at 636.
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